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Abstract 
The problem of intentional inexistence arises because the following (alleged) intu-
itions are mutually conflicting: it seems that sometimes we think about things that 
do not exist; it seems that intentionality is a relation between a thinker and what 
such a thinker thinks about; it seems that relations entail the existence of what they 
relate. In this paper, I argue for what I call a radical relationist solution. First, I 
contend that the extant arguments for the view that relations entail the existence 
of their relata are wanting. In this regard, I defend a kind of pluralism about rela-
tions according to which more than one kind of relation involves non-existents. 
Second, I contend that there are reasons to maintain that all thoughts are relations 
between thinkers and the things they are about. More accurately, I contend that 
the radical relationist solution is to be preferred to both the intentional content 
solution (as developed by Crane) and the adverbial property solution (as devel-
oped by Kriegel). Finally, I argue that once the distinction between thinking “X” 
and thinking about X has been drawn, the radical relationist solution can handle 
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1   Introduction 
 
In the Theaetetus (189a–b; Plato 1921, p. 175), we read the following dialogue:  
 
Socrates: So, then, does not he who holds an opinion (δοξάζει) hold an opinion of 
some one thing? 
Theaetetus: He must do so. 
Socrates: And does not he who holds an opinion of some one thing hold an opinion 
of something that is? 
Theaetetus: I agree. 
Socrates: Then he who holds an opinion of what is not (μὴ ὂν) holds an opinion of 
nothing. 
Theaetetus: Evidently. 
Socrates: Well then, he who holds an opinion of nothing, holds no opinion at all 
(οὐδὲ δοξάζει). 
Theaetetus: That is plain, apparently. 
 
The quoted passage may be the first textual evidence in which the so-called problem of 
intentional inexistence comes to the fore.1 The problem is described by Crane (2001a, p. 
23) as a “persistent and traditional problem” and by Kriegel (2007, p. 307) as “one of 
the perennial problems of philosophy.” In its schematic form, it arises because the fol-
lowing (alleged) intuitions are mutually conflicting. First, it seems that sometimes we 
think of or about things that do not exist―unicorns, round squares, golden mountains, 
and the like; second, it seems that intentionality―standardly understood as about-
ness―is a relation between a thinker and what such a thinker is thinking of; third, it 
seems that relations entail the existence of what they relate. 
 
1 The name is Kriegel’s (2007, p. 308). Crane’s (2001a, p. 23) name for the same problem is the “problem 
of intentionality.” Since Crane’s name is also used for another problem―as Crane himself notices―I 
prefer to use the one chosen by Kriegel. The term “intentional inexistence” has medieval roots and was 
famously revived by Franz Brentano (1874). The problem of intentional inexistence presents striking 
similarities with the “problem of objectless presentations,” which was heavily debated at the turn of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It should be carefully distinguished from the problem of negative 
singular existence statements (such as “Sherlock Holmes does not exist”), which is sometimes called the 
“problem of non-existence.” On the latter, see Salmon (1998). 
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In Theaetetus 189a–b, Socrates seems to discard the idea that we can think of non-
existents.2 As we will see, a solution along these lines is given by contemporary phi-
losophers too. However, it is not the only solution one can give. Moreover, it is not the 
most popular one; indeed, the recent trend has been to reject the view of intentionality 
as a relation between a thinker and what that thinker is thinking about (see, notably, 
Crane 2001a, 2013 and Kriegel 2007, 2008). In this paper, I will go against this trend. 
Negatively, I will argue that what we should reject is the claim that relations entail the 
existence of what they relate. Positively, I will argue that all thoughts are relations 
between thinkers and the things they are about. Roughly speaking, I will defend the 
view that intentionality is a (dyadic) relation between a subject and an object. I will 
refer to this view as radical relationism.3 To the best of my knowledge, a full-fledged 
and updated defence of this view is still lacking in the contemporary literature. Gross-
mann (1992) and Priest (2005) may be regarded as radical relationists but neither of 
them engages with the most recent (and refined) attempts to dismiss the view of rela-
tions as not entailing existence, or argues extensively that the theory is preferable to 
prominent competitors―which is what I intend to do here. 
I will proceed as follows. §2 presents in detail the problem of intentional inexistence. 
§3 argues for what I call a radical relationist solution. In particular, §3.1 evaluates the 
claim that relations entail the existence of their relata, whereas §3.2 argues that the 
radical relationist solution is preferable to the two most prominent solutions to the 
problem, namely, the intentional content solution (as developed by Tim Crane) and 
the adverbial property solution (as developed by Uriah Kriegel). §4 puts forward and 
elucidates the distinction between thinking “X” and thinking about X, and in light of this 
distinction addresses some potential issues that radical relationism has to face―chiefly, 





2 Socrates speaks of “holding an opinion” (δοξάζειν), not merely of “thinking.” The difference here is not 
important, however, since the problem of intentional inexistence concerns both doxastic and non-dox-
astic attitudes. 
3 I speak of a relationist solution instead of relational solution because this latter label is frequently used 
to refer to the view that intentionality is a relation between an existent thinker and an existent thought-
about thing (see, e.g., Crane 2012, p. 421; Centrone 2016, p. 4; Zarepour 2018, p. 454)―which is not the 
view I will argue for.  
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2   The problem 
 
A classic regimentation of the problem can be found in Crane (2001a, p. 23). Here it is: 
 
(1) Some thoughts are about things which do not exist. 
(2) Relations entail the existence of their relata. 
(3) All thoughts are relations between thinkers and the things they are about. 
 
Another regimentation has been given by Kriegel (2007, p. 307) in the following terms: 
 
(1*) One can think of non-existents. 
(2*) One cannot bear a relation to non-existents. 
(3*) Thinking of something involves (constitutively) bearing a relation to it.4 
 
Four brief clarifications are in order. By “thinking” what is meant is the most basic 
mental activity; “thing” is the most general term one could use―it simply covers eve-
rything (even thoughts); “existent” stands for “actual” or “real,” so that (merely) pos-
sible things like unicorns or golden mountains do not count as existents; and a relation 
is at least something which can be expressed by a two-place predicate―whether it is 
also something which is existence-entailing is precisely our question.  
The “can,” “cannot,” and “involves (constitutively)” which appear in Kriegel’s reg-
imentation can be read as modal operators (see also Kriegel 2007, p. 329 fn 4): (1*) can 
be read as implicitly saying that it is possible that one thinks about non-existents―or 
that it is not necessary that one’s thought is a thought about an existent; (2*) can be 
read as implicitly saying that it is impossible that one bears a relation to non-exist-
ents―or that it is necessary that a relation between oneself and something is a relation 
between oneself and an existent; and (3*) can be read as implicitly saying that it is 
necessary that thinking about x is a relation to x―or that it is impossible that one’s 
thought about x is not a relation to x.5 Another way of formulating the problem is as 
follows: thoughts about things which do not exist are possible; relations to things 
which do not exist are impossible; and thoughts are necessarily relations between 
thinkers and the things they are about. 
 
4 A further version, similar to Kriegel’s, can be found in Thomas (2019, p. 1201). 
5 Kriegel’s formulation of (3*) is actually “Thinking something involves (constitutively) bearing a relation 
to it.” The absence of “of” is significant, as will become clear (see §4 below). 
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To a great extent, Kriegel’s and Crane’s regimentations can be treated as equiva-
lent.6 As Russell (2010, pp. 64–65) said, propositions of the form “It is possible that x’s 
are F” can be reduced to propositions of the form “Some x’s are F”, and propositions of 
the form “It is necessary that x’s are F” can be reduced to propositions of the form “All 
x’s are F”. Hence, one can reduce (1*) and (3*) to (1) and (3) respectively. And again 
following Russell, one can reduce the necessity implicitly claimed in (2*) to the entail-
ment explicitly claimed in (2). 
The problem of intentional inexistence arises because (1/1*)–(2/2*)–(3/3*) are prima 
facie plausible if considered separately, but form an inconsistent triad. Indeed, if we 
jointly accept all of them, then by modus ponens we are forced to conclude either that 
all thoughts are relations between thinkers and the things they are about but some are 
not, or that we can bear relations to things to which we cannot bear relations.7 Of 
course, it might be held that all the relevant propositions turn out to be undeniable 
under scrutiny and then we can conclude that the problem of intentional inexistence 
is simply insoluble. I will argue that one of the propositions in question is false and 
hence must be rejected. (In the following, I will use “(1)” to refer to both (1) and its 
modal counterpart, and likewise for (2/2*) and (3/3*).) 
 
3   A radical relationist solution 
 
Let us explore two ways of solving the problem. First, one could reject the thesis that 
thoughts about things which do not exist are possible―namely, (1). Second, one could 
reject the thesis that thoughts are necessarily relations between thinkers and the things 
they are about―namely, (3). 
 
 
6 “To a great extent” because, strictly speaking, (2*) is not the modal analogue of (2): (2) is a general 
principle―it speaks of relations as such; (2*) is an application of this principle―it speaks of relations 
involving subjects. I will leave this detail aside. 
7 To better visualize the contradictions, one can give a formalization of the problem by using standard 
logical symbols (“∧”, “¬”, “⊨”), a relatively widespread notation for relations (“R(x,y)”), and Parsons’s 
(1980) existence predicate (“E!”). Let “x.T.y” stand for “x thinks of y.” The formalization would be as 
follows: (1+) x.T.y ∧ E!x ∧ ¬E!y; (2+) R(x,y) ⊨ (E!x ∧ E!y); (3+) x.T.y ⊨ R(x,y)―where “R(x,y)” stands for 
“x is related to y” or “A relation between x and y obtains” and “⊨” stands for entailment or implication. 
(1+), (2+), and (3+) jointly imply that (x.T.y ⊨ R(x,y)) ∧ (x.T.y ∧ ¬R(x,y)), or that (R(x,y) ⊨ (E!x ∧ E!y)) ∧ 
(E!x ∧ ¬E!y ∧ R(x,y)). 
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On rejecting (1). As already mentioned, in Theaetetus 189a–b Socrates appears to main-
tain that we cannot think about things which do not exist. More precisely, he appears 
to suggest that when we seem to be thinking about non-existents, we are actually not 
thinking at all, as he says: “Well then, he who holds an opinion of nothing, holds no 
opinion at all” (ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅ γε μηδὲν δοξάζων τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲ δοξάζει; my emphasis). Con-
temporary scholars too have taken the route of rejecting (1): Prior (1971), Searle (1983), 
and Sainsbury (2018) appear to hold that there is a compelling sense in which thoughts 
cannot be about non-existents (see Crane 2013, pp. 95–96), whereas Thomas (2019) de-
velops a view on which when we seem to think about non-existents we are actually 
thinking about “possibilia”―a notion borrowed from Lewisian modal realism. 
I will not enter into the details of these positions, which have been already criticized 
(I refer especially to Kriegel 2007, pp. 310–311 and Crane 2013, p. 96), but will rather 
limit myself to assessing an argumentative strategy which one could likely exploit to 
reject (1). This is centred on the following two theses: 
 
(i) If x thinks about y, then y causes x’s thought about y. 
(ii) If x causes y, then x exists (ex nihilo nihil fit). 
 
On this basis, one can deny that it is possible to think about non-existents, for on the 
view in question thinking implies causation and causation implies existence. Kriegel 
(2007, p. 311) seems to endorse (i), as he states that “representation presupposes causal 
contact with the represented”―where “thinking” is considered by him (2007, p. 308, 
2008, p. 83 fn 12) as a “species” of “representing.” 
Is this strategy convincing? While (ii) seems hardly disputable, (i) is highly conten-
tious. Assuming the common understanding of causation―the one implicit in “x kicks 
y,” for instance―(i) turns out to be too strong. If (i) held, we would be forced to say 
that we cannot think of stars that are billions of light years away, to give but one ex-
ample (see also Thomas 2019, pp. 1205–1206 on this). However, there is a straight-for-
ward sense in which we can think of such things. (Arguably, if you are reading this 
paper, you are).8 
More generally, whatever the argumentative strategy against (1) is, it seems that (1) 
cannot be comfortably dismissed. For some, it simply expresses a “manifest fact” 
 
8 To question (i), one can also resort to an ingenious thought experiment which can be traced back to 
scholastic philosophy (see Taieb 2018, pp. 44–46). Suppose that a malicious God causes in your mind a 
thought about your laptop. In such a case, the object of your thought and the cause of your thought 
would be distinct. 
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(Crane 2001a, p. 23). For others, a theory of intentionality that flatly rejected it “would 
just be inadequate” (Spinelli 2016, p. 95), if not “absurd” (Kriegel 2008, p. 94). 
 
On rejecting (3). Rejecting (3) amounts to holding that thoughts are not necessarily 
relations between thinkers and the things they are about. In Crane’s (2001a, p. 23) 
terms, it amounts to holding that not all thoughts are relations between thinkers and 
the things they are about; in Kriegel’s (2007, p. 307) terms, it amounts to holding that 
thinking of something does not involve (constitutively) bearing a relation to it. The 
two most prominent solutions to the problem of intentional inexistence rely on the 
denial of (3). These are the intentional content solution, mainly developed by Crane 
(2001a, 2013), and the adverbial property solution, mainly developed by Kriegel (2007, 
2008). 
Let us start with the intentional content solution. When we state that we are think-
ing about our father, say, we obviously mean that we are thinking about him, and in 
general, when we state that we are thinking about X, we obviously mean that we are 
thinking about X. Put differently, by “the thing a thought is about” we obviously mean 
the thing itself, not something else, such as a copy of it or a proxy. Accordingly, we are 
inclined to say that thinking about our father involves (constitutively) bearing a rela-
tion to him, not to something else. Well, the advocate of the intentional content solution 
denies that all thoughts are relations between thinkers and the things they are typically 
taken to be about, namely, that thinking of something involves (constitutively) bearing 
a relation to what is typically taken to be the relatum. In other words, she denies that 
thinking of X involves (constitutively) bearing a relation to X. She holds that the only 
relation that thinking about something involves (constitutively) is a relation to the “in-
tentional content” of the relevant thought. The intentional content is conceived of by 
her as “the way” in which the relevant thing is “presented” (e.g., Crane 2001a, pp. 18, 
29). In Crane’s example: when one thinks of Saint Petersburg as Saint Petersburg, the 
intentional content of one’s thought is different from when one thinks of Saint Peters-
burg as Leningrad. Crane (2001a, p. 32) expresses his view in Fregean terms, saying that 
the intentional content is to the thought-about thing (viz., the object) as the sense is to 
the referent. Hence, on the intentional content solution, when we are thinking of our 
father we do not bear a relation to him, for we rather bear a relation just to the way we 
present him―for example, the intentional content “my father.” The advocate of the 
intentional content solution argues as follows. Certainly, one can think about non-ex-
istents; and certainly, one cannot bear a relation to non-existents; however, I just hold 
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that all thoughts are relations between thinkers and intentional contents, which neces-
sarily exist.9 In Crane’s (2001a, pp. 32–33) words: 
 
What does it mean to say that intentional states are relations to intentional contents 
but not to intentional objects? The relevant point is this: the content of the state 
must always exist, but the object of the state need not exist. […] thoughts […] are 
relations to their contents. (emphasis mine) 
 
What about the adverbialist? This theorist denies that thoughts are necessarily rela-
tions, namely, that thinking about something involves (constitutively) bearing a rela-
tion to anything whatsoever. The adverbialist attempts to capture the nature of inten-
tionality by rephrasing propositions of the form “S thinks about X” as “S thinks X-ly” 
or “S thinks X-wise.” For example, “John thinks of an angel” becomes “John thinks 
angelly” or “John thinks angel-wise.” According to the adverbial property solution, all 
thoughts are (“non-relational,” “adverbial”) properties of thinkers,10 but not all thoughts 
are relations between thinkers and the things they are about. Only true, veridical 
thoughts are such relations (see Kriegel 2008, pp. 89–90).  
The time is ripe for addressing two questions. First: do we have reasons to maintain 
(2)? Second: do we have reasons to maintain (3)? I will answer no to the first question 




9 The intentional content solution presents similarities to the theory of immanent objects, which is often 
attributed to Brentano (1874) and Kazimierz Twardowski (1894). The immanentist holds that the only 
relation that thinking about something involves (constitutively) is a relation to a mental item, namely, 
an “immanent object,” which exists only in the mind of the thinker. Hence, on the theory of immanent 
objects, when we are thinking about our father we do not bear a relation to him, for we rather bear a 
relation to a mental proxy―the immanent father, say. By ascribing to the immanent object (a kind of) 
existence, the immanentist preserves (2). She argues as follows. Certainly, one can think of non-exist-
ents; and certainly, one cannot bear a relation to non-existents. However, I just hold that all thoughts 
are relations between thinkers and immanent objects, which necessarily exist (albeit only mentally). For 
a contemporary defence of the theory, see Brandl (2005); on the question as to whether Brentano really 
held such a view, see Voltolini (2015) and Taieb (2018). 
10 The view on which thoughts are properties of thinkers is sometimes referred to as the parametric view 
and is contrasted with the adverbial property view (see, e.g., Centrone 2016, pp. 3–4). For an argument 
to the effect that the intentional content view collapses into the adverbial property view, see Kriegel 
(2008, pp. 92–93). 
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3.1   Do relations entail the existence of their relata? 
 
Kriegel contends that to reject (2) is a “counter-intuitive” (2007, p. 311) option. He 
(2008, p. 86) expands on this point as follows: 
 
[N]obody thinks it remotely plausible that a monadic property could be instanti-
ated even when there is no entity that instantiates it, e.g., that squareness could be 
instantiated even if there are no squares. The same sense of absurdity should at-
tach, I contend, to the parallel claim about relations: just as a monadic property 
cannot be instantiated in the absence of an instantiator, so a relation cannot be in-
stantiated in the absence of relata. (reiterated in Kriegel 2011, p. 140) 
 
Kriegel refers to the following two theses: 
 
(T1) If x is F, then x exists.11  
(T2) If x is related to y, then x exists and y exists. 
  
These theses, however, are less widely accepted than Kriegel thinks. Concerning T1, 
already Ernst Mally (1904) and Alexius Meinong (1904) advanced the Independence 
Principle. In current terms, this principle says that for a particular to instantiate a mo-
nadic property it is not necessary that that particular exist. In Meinong’s (1904, p. 8) 
terms, the Independence principle says that the “so-being” (Sosein) of a particular is 
not affected by its “non-being” (Nichtsein). In Mally’s (1904, p. 126) example, “an om-
niscient man is omniscient, even if he does not exist.”12 
Something like the Independence Principle is embraced by some contemporary phi-
losophers too (notably Priest 2005). These philosophers also typically hold that the 
standard argument for T2 is flawed. For instance, Priest (2005, p. 60 fn 7) writes: 
 
It is not uncommon to find philosophers (not to mention any names!) arguing that 
intentional relations are not really relations, since relations require the existence of 
their relata, demonstrating this last claim by taking an existence-entailing relation, 
 
11 Kriegel’s phrasing of the first thesis makes one think to the principle of existential introduction (often 
written as “Fa → ∃x(Fx)”; see, e.g., Reicher 2019)―a core principle of the first-order predicate calculus. 
In my formulation (“If x is F, then x exists”), however, the thesis is better thought of as the informal 
counterpart of the so-called predication principle (often written as “Fa → ∃x(x = a)”; see, e.g., Reicher 
2019). 
12 For a contemporary argument that can be considered an argument in favour of the principle, see 
Yagisawa (2005).  
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such as “x hit y,” and pointing out that if x hit y then x and y exist. The invalidity 
of inferring a property of all relations from the fact that one relation has it is stag-
gering. 
 
Even if we grant for the sake of argument that causal relations are existence-entail-
ing―which is not uncontroversial, as we will see shortly―we are still not in a position 
to assert T2. For to infer that every relation entails the existence of its relata from the 
fact that a relation of a certain kind entails the existence of its relata is fallacious. Cru-
cially, such a fallacy is present in Kriegel (2007, pp. 307–308). 
Importantly, the view that relations do not entail the existence of their relata is not 
a contemporary innovation: it was fairly standard among Meinong pupils (see notably 
Höfler 1890, pp. 104–105) and was held by both Kazimierz Twardowski (1894, pp. 27–
29) and the late Brentano (see Taieb 2018, pp. 108–117).13 All this should be enough to 
show that the thesis that relations entail the existence of their relata is considerably less 
intuitive than Kriegel thinks. Arguably, what is universally regarded as “absurd” (in 
the technical sense of involving a contradiction) is not the negation of T2 but rather the 
negation of what follows: 
 
(T3) If a relation R obtains between x and y, then x is a relatum of R and y is a relatum of R. 
 
Surely, a relation without its relata is not even remotely plausible. 
Still, Kriegel (2007, pp. 311–312) does not limit himself to evoking (alleged) intui-
tions. He also critically assesses two dialectical routes for rejecting (2) and argues that 
neither of them seems to be a solution to the problem of intentional inexistence. We 
can state them as follows: 
 
First route. Intentionality is the only kind of relation which does not entail the exist-
ence of its relata (i.e., intentionality is the only kind of relation which involve non-
existents). For the sake of brevity, call this route R-exceptionalism. 
Second route. There are many kinds of relations which do not entail the existence of 
their relata (i.e., there are many kinds of relations which involve non-existents). In-
tentionality is only one among them. Call this route R-pluralism. 
 
 
13 It is worth noting that these remarks do not amount to an argument from authority. I am not saying 
that we should reject (2) because renowned philosophers did so; I am just pointing out that Kriegel’s 
assertion that nobody rejects (2) is not true. 
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According to R-exceptionalism, there is one and only one relation which does not en-
tail the existence of its relata; according to R-pluralism, there are several relations that 
entail the existence of their relata, and several that do not. Kriegel (2007, p. 311) con-
siders R-exceptionalism unattractive: 
 
[R-exceptionalism] is unappealing in the same way any metaphysical exceptional-
ism would be: it is odd to maintain that a certain metaphysical truth holds of all 
entities of type T except one. 
 
Kriegel’s point seems to be the following. Compare “Swans are white” with “Relations 
entail the existence of their relata.” It is not odd to maintain that the former holds of 
all kinds of swan except one; empirical truths do admit of exceptions―that is, they are 
not universal. By contrast, it is odd to maintain that “Relations entail the existence of 
their relata” holds of all kinds of relation except one. Metaphysical truths, so the argu-
ment goes, are by definition universal truths―that is, they admit of no exceptions. Now, 
such a view of metaphysical truths surely has some plausibility; moreover, exception-
alist moves seem to be ad hoc moves. In other words, R-exceptionalism seems to be 
contentious on both the substantial and the dialectical level. Thus, R-exceptionalism 
seems not to be a viable route for rejecting (2).  
So let us explore R-pluralism. In this regard, we are supposed to adduce at least one 
kind of relation which is not intentional and is borne to non-existents. The more rela-
tions of this kind are adduced, the stronger will be R-pluralism. Consider first the fol-
lowing sentence: 
 
x wholly precedes y. 
 
Such a sentence is sometimes taken to express a relation which involves non-existents 
(see Taieb 2018, p. 5), where x is taken to be a non-existent. However, as Grossman 
(1992, p. 94) has acutely noticed, “x wholly precedes y” is not a good candidate, for one 
can say that even if x occurs earlier than y, then x and y both exist, even though they 
do not exist at the same time: x occurs at t1―and hence exists (at t1)―whereas y occurs at 
t2―and hence exists (at t2). Of course, one could evoke presentism―the doctrine on 
which only present things exist―but that move might be regarded as having a high 
price.  
Analogous considerations apply to another relation which could be adduced: 
 




Here y is taken to be a non-existent on the grounds that it does not need to exist for x 
to take place. Such a relation is also often adduced as a counterexample to the thesis 
that causal relations are existence-entailing (or to the thesis that non-existents are cau-
sally inert). Again, one might say that even if x occurs long after y, x and y both exist, 
although they do not exist at the same time: x occurs at time t1―and hence exists (at 
t1)―whereas y occurs at time t2―and hence exists (at t2).  
Grossmann (1992, pp. 74–75) claims that the logical connective of disjunction expres-
ses a relation. On this basis, he argues that sentences like the following express rela-
tions involving non-existents: 
 
Either the earth revolves around the sun or 2 + 2 = 5. 
 
According to Grossman, “either/or” may connect “existent states of affairs” (e.g., the 
earth revolves around the sun) with “non-existent states of affairs” (e.g., 2 + 2 = 5). 
This proposal, however, is open to criticism: one may contend, making a Wittgenstein-
ian move, that logical connectives do not express relations.14 
Fortunately, we do not need to resort to exotic or contentious examples, for we have 
at our disposal ordinary, non-contentious kinds of relation which might be thought to 
involve non-existents. First and foremost, I have in mind similarity and difference. Con-
sider the following sentences: 
 
Unicorns are similar to horses. 
Unicorns are different from centaurs. 
Unicorns are bigger than mice. 
 
We can even consider impossible things: 
 
Elliptical squares are different from straight lines. 
 
More generally, we can think of countless sentences of the form “x ≅ y” or “x ≠ y” 
expressing relations which involve non-existents. 




14 Grossmann (1992, pp. 79–81) himself refers to Wittgenstein as someone who might object to this view. 
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[I]n the sentence “lions are smaller than dragons,” lions are claimed, truly no less, 
to bear the (non-intentional) relation of being-smaller than to non-existents. But 
the sentence seems better thought of as ellipsis for something like “if there were 
dragons, lions would be smaller than them.” This is more clearly evident in cases 
involving only non-existents, such as “unicorns are smaller than dragons,” which 
seems to be ellipsis for “if there were unicorns and dragons, the former would be 
smaller than the latter.” These sentences are counterfactuals, then, so they do not 
claim that a certain relation is instantiated by non-existents; only that it would be 
instantiated if they existed. The problem of intentional inexistence arises, however, 
because a relation seems to be instantiated (in the actual world), since the repre-
senting of something does occur (in the actual world), even though the relevant 
relatum does not exist (in the actual world). Thus, “you are thinking of dragons” 
is not ellipsis for “if there were dragons, you would be thinking of them.” No: the 
statement is that you are thinking of dragons. 
 
Kriegel holds that sentences which express comparative relations between non-exist-
ents are in fact “ellipsis” for counterfactuals. More accurately, let φ be a non-existent. A 
sentence of the form “x bears a comparative relation R to φ,” Kriegel says, is just an 
ellipsis for “If there were such thing as φ, then x would bear R to φ.” Again, let φ and 
ψ be non-existents. A sentence of the form “φ bears a comparative relation R to ψ,” he 
says, is just an ellipsis for “If there were such things as φ and ψ, then φ would bear R 
to ψ.” To all appearances, Kriegel would say that comparative statements involving 
impossible things―such as “Elliptical squares are different from straight lines”―are 
counterpossibles in disguise. 
How could an R-pluralist respond to Kriegel’s move? First of all, she could point 
out that Kriegel postulates an ambiguity. Specifically, he postulates that on some oc-
casions of its use―those involving non-existents―“[…] is smaller than […]” is to be 
understood as “[…] would be smaller than […],” leaving it implicit that the same holds 
for every kind of comparative expression. Whenever a speaker says “Mice are smaller 
than elephants,” Kriegel says, we are allowed to think that she means that a certain 
relation obtains. By contrast, he goes on, whenever a speaker says “Lions are smaller 
than dragons,” we ought to think that she means only that a certain relation would 
obtain if certain conditions obtained. What then should be said about this postulation 
that there is an ambiguity? Not only does it have the air of an ad hoc move, one might 
also contend that it does not respect Grice’s Razor, according to which one ought not to 




[O]ne should not suppose what a speaker would mean when he used a word in a 
certain range of cases to count as a special sense of the word, if it should be pre-
dictable, independently of any supposition that there is such a sense, that he would 
use the word (or the sentence containing it) with just that meaning. (Grice 1989, 
pp. 47–48) 
 
Now, Kriegel employs the postulation of ambiguity precisely in comparative sen-
tences. He multiplies the senses of sentences involving “[…] is smaller than […]” and 
the like. As such, his move can be dismissed as a violation of the Gricean principle. Of 
course, as Grice (1989, p. 48) himself suggests, Kriegel could try to show that the ap-
plication of expressions like “is smaller than” outside the range of existents, despite 
being prima facie legitimate, is in fact “uncomfortable.” But presumably Kriegel would 
argue for such an uncomfortability by contending that this application committs us to 
the idea of relations which are not existence-entailing―which in the present context is 
clearly question-begging. 
Secondly, one might argue that Kriegel’s view risks falling into a kind of exception-
alism. Indeed, it could be considered a metaphysical truth that all sentences which are 
in fact counterfactuals do display the structure of counterfactuals. However, Kriegel 
claims that comparative sentences involving non-existents are peculiar: they do not 
display the structure of counterfactuals, even if they are in fact counterfactuals. It 
might be contended that pending a further (compelling) instance of a counterfactual 
in disguise―which Kriegel owes us―Kriegel’s view implies a (metaphysical) excep-
tionalism about sentences.  
Finally, Kriegel’s move rests on an asymmetry claim which is highly disputable. For 
him, “Lions are smaller than dragons” and “Eva is thinking of a dragon” are not sym-
metrical, because it is only in the second case that “a relation seems to be instantiated 
(in the actual world), since the representing of something does occur (in the actual 
world).” This is misleading, however, for the situation is arguably symmetrical: “Eva 
is thinking of a dragon” is to “Lions are smaller than dragons” as (say) “If Eva were 
knowledgeable about mythical creatures, she would be thinking of a dragon” is to 
(say) “If lions had a tiny trunk, they would be smaller than unicorns.” The first two 
sentences express an actual relation―that is, a relation which obtains―whereas the sec-
ond two sentences express a possible relation―that is, a relation which could obtain. 
Thus, if a sentence like “Lions are smaller than dragons” is to be understood as “If 
there were dragons, lions would be smaller than them,” then, for reasons of symmetry, 
a sentence like “Eva is thinking of a dragon” is to be understood as “if there were a 
14/31 
 
dragon, then Eva would be thinking of it.” Now, just as the first paraphrase suggests 
that the fact that x is smaller than y presupposes that both x and y exist, the second 
paraphrase suggests that the fact that someone is thinking of x presupposes that both 
that someone and x exist―which amounts to the negation of (1). Yet, as we have seen, 
and as Kriegel (2008, p. 94) himself seems to hold, such a thesis is implausible. 
 
3.2   Are thoughts necessarily relations to the things one thinks about? 
 
We have seen that the extant arguments for the view that relations entail the existence 
of their relata are wanting. If this is so, then we are allowed to maintain that one (a 
subject) can bear a relation to non-existents. Now the question is: do we have reasons 
to maintain (3), namely, the thesis that all thoughts are relations between thinkers and 
the things they are about (or that thinking of something involves (constitutively) bear-
ing a relation to it)? In this section, I will argue that the answer is yes. More precisely, 
I will argue that the radical relationist solution is to be preferred to the (Cranean) in-
tentional content solution and the (Kriegelian) adverbial property solution.15 
As we know, the intentional content solution maintains that all thoughts are rela-
tions. However, it maintains this idea only in a qualified form: for the defender of this 
solution, all thoughts are relations between thinkers and intentional contents (which 
necessarily exist). Since the intentional content solution maintains that intentionality 
displays a relational structure, it can be labelled the moderate relationist solution. It de-
nies that all thoughts are relations between thinkers and the things they are about. This 
idea is preserved in what I call the radical relationist solution. The moderate relationist 
solution discards (3); the radical relationist solution discards (2). 
Why should we prefer the radical relationist solution to the moderate one? Consider 
once again the core claim of the intentional content solution. It denies that all thoughts 
are relations between thinkers and the things which they are about. However, it does 
not say that no thoughts are relations between thinkers and the things which they are 
 
15 There is a classical worry about solutions that reject (3): on the one hand, “our thoughts would be 
imprisoned in our own minds” (Brandl 2005, p. 169); on the other hand, “it remains an ontological mys-
tery of how the mind can ‘connect’ with anything, even with itself” (Grossmann 1992, p. 94). I do not 
press this point because I think that the solutions in question can deal with it. Advocates of the inten-
tional content solution and adverbialists could promptly reply that the requirement in question has to 
be satisfied by veridical intentionality, not by intentionality as such. Using (2) as a lever, they could argue 
that if the thing which is thought about does not exist, then there is simply nothing which the thinker 
should be related to. This move is explicitly made by Kriegel (2008, pp. 89–90). 
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about. For the defender of this solution, some thoughts are relations between thinkers 
and the things they are about. Which thoughts? True, veridical ones―namely, thoughts 
about existing things (see Crane 2001a, p. 26). In other words, the defender of the in-
tentional content solution states that all thoughts are relations between thinkers and 
their intentional contents, and some thoughts (but not all) are relations between think-
ers and the things they are about.16 More formally, let S stand for a subject, iT for the 
intentional content of the relevant thought, R(α,β) for “α is related β” or “A relation 
between α and β obtains,” and ⊨ for entailment or implication (for this last notation, I 
follow Spinelli 2016, p. 99): 
 
S thinks of X ⊨ R(S,iT) 
 
Now consider thoughts about existing things. For example, consider a thought about 
Angela Merkel. The defender of the intentional content solution says: 
 
(S thinks of X ∧ X exists) ⊨ (R(S,iT) ∧ R(S,X)) 
 
In this regard, it is worth noting that the defender of the intentional content solution 
cannot escape positing such a complicated structure by resorting to conditional iden-
tity.17 Let X be the thought-about thing. She may not say: 
 
X exists ⊨ (X = iT)  
 
so that just one relation would obtain. The reason is that the intentional content of a 
thought T is by definition distinct from the thing that T is about. In Fregean terms, the 
sense is not the referent: Hesperus is Venus, but the intentional content “Hesperus” is 
not Venus. Consequently, relations between thinkers and intentional contents neces-
sarily differ in kind from relations between thinkers and thought-about things. 
How does the radical relationist account for veridical cases (i.e., thoughts about ex-
istent things)? In the same way as he accounts for non-veridical cases (i.e., thoughts 
 
16 To put it in Crane’s (2013) more mature terms: all thoughts are about something, and some thoughts 
(but not all) refer to something. For a critical examination of Crane’s distinction between aboutness and 
reference, see Zarepour (2018). 
17 A theory of intentionality centred on conditional identity has been proposed by Küng (1984, pp. 148–
150). It can be put as follows: if a thing X exists and a thought T is about X, then the object of T is identical 
to X; by contrast, if a thing Y does not exist and a thought T* is about Y, then the object of T* is not 
identical to Y. 
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about non-existent things). Consider a non-veridical case; all the radical relationist 
says is: 
 
(S thinks of X ∧ X does not exist) ⊨ R(S,X) 
 
Now consider a veridical case; all the radical relationist says is: 
 
(S thinks of Y ∧ Y exists) ⊨ R(S,Y) 
 
Since she rejects (2), the radical relationist can account for veridical intentionality by 
evoking just one kind of relation. More accurately: while the defender of the intentional 
content solution accounts for veridical intentionality by evoking two kinds of rela-
tion―relations between thinkers and intentional contents and relations between thinkers 
and thought-about things―the radical relationist invokes just one kind of relation, name-
ly, the relation between the thinker and the thought-about thing. We are now in a po-
sition to answer our question: the radical relationist solution should be preferred to 
the intentional content solution because, unlike the latter, it does not posit an unnec-
essarily complicated structure in order to account for veridical intentionality. 
Of course, the defender of the intentional content solution could reply that the rad-
ical relationist solution is more parsimonious with respect to intentionality only be-
cause it is less parsimonious in another respect, that is, with respect to relations. Indeed, 
whereas the intentional content solution admits only relations involving existents, the 
radical relationist solution admits both relations involving existents and relations in-
volving non-existents. Such a rejoinder, however, is hardly effective, for as we have 
seen, to deny the existence of relations involving non-existent involves a greater cost 
than accepting it: either we risk violating Grice’s razor or we risk falling into a kind of 
exceptionalism. 
Still, the defender of the intentional content solution could counterargue as follows. 
First, something like an intentional content is a cornerstone of the structure of inten-
tionality:18 if a subject S thinks of X, then X is presented in a certain way. Second, S’s 
thought is a relation between S and the relevant “way of presenting,” that is, the in-
tentional content of the relevant thought―let us refer to it as iT. Hence, if S thinks of X, 
 
18 Actually, Crane is not so assertive. He (2012, p. 419) writes: “The notions of mode and [intentional] 
content can be criticized; they form the beginnings of a theory of intentionality and some theorists might 
want to theorise about intentionality without using these notions.” Crane (2001a, p. 29) expressly refers 
to Brentano as a theorist who did not employ the notion of intentional content.  
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then a relation between S and iT obtains. The upshot is that the radical relationist would 
be more extravagant than others, for she would be committed to the following (let an 
asterisk indicate difference between intentional contents):  
 
(S thinks of X ∧ X exists) ⊨ (R(S,iT) ∧ R(S,X)) 
(S thinks of Y ∧ Y does not exist) ⊨ (R(S,iT*) ∧ R(S,Y)) 
 
However, this argument can be blocked by questioning the distinction between 
thought and “intentional content” (as understood by Crane). In my view, there are two 
ways to show that thoughts are to be distinguished from “intentional contents,” that 
is, “the ways” something is “presented”: either to show that the same thought can have 
distinct intentional contents or to show that distinct thoughts can have the same intentional 
content. One is tempted to take the case of two subjects that both think “my father” and 
the case of one and the same subject that thinks “my father” twice as cases of distinct 
thoughts which have the same intentional content. But this can be easily questioned. 
One may indeed say that in such cases there are two thoughts occurring which are only 
numerically distinct.19 The case of co-referential terms can be cashed out by the radical 
relationist without employing the distinction between thought and intentional content 
as well. She may say that “Saint Petersburg” and “Leningrad” simply are two different 
thoughts (i.e., two different “ways of presenting” or “presentations”) about one and 
the same thing (a Russian city), that is, two different intentional relations (or thinking-
of relations) which share a single relatum. Hence, the radical relationist can reply that 
what her competitor calls “intentional content” is nothing but (or can be reduced to) 
what she calls “thought.” To put it differently, the radical relationist could contend 
that once the notion of thought is employed, the notion of intentional content turns out 
 
19 Notice that to say that two thoughts have the same intentional content―that is, that they are associated 
with the same “way of presenting”―is not simply to say that two thoughts have the same content. If by 
“content” one means simply the totality of the properties of something, then there is a straightforward 
sense in which the thoughts “Angela Merkel” and “Angela Merkel” have the same content, for this just 
means that they are qualitatively identical (like two balls which share all the same properties). In this 
connection, an anonymous reviewer for this journal suggests that the case of a subject that first believes 
that Leningrad is in Russia and then doubts that Leningrad is in Russia is a case of distinct thoughts with 
the same intentional content. Still, one may contend that in such case there are just two qualitatively 
identical (complex) thoughts―and hence two qualitatively identical (complex) intentional contents―at-
tached with distinct modes (belief, doubt). More generally, one may contend that the notion of thought 
does not involve the notion of mode. 
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to be redundant: “Saint Petersburg” and “Leningrad” are not thoughts that have dif-
ferent intentional contents; they are just different thoughts. For all that Crane’s defini-
tion of intentional content says, nothing compels us to accept that thoughts have “in-
tentional contents” (i.e., “ways of presenting”); we could say instead that thoughts are 
“intentional contents.” On this view, it makes no sense to say that all thoughts are rela-
tions between subjects and intentional contents, for the latter are the very thoughts 
themselves, and hence are the very relations (indeed, we would end up saying that all 
thoughts are relations between subjects and themselves, which is clearly odd). As a 
result, the only relation that obtains is the relation between thinkers and thought-about 
things. 
Let us move on. Why should we prefer the radical relationist solution to the adver-
bial property solution? Recall how the adverbialist attempts to capture the nature of 
intentionality. He rephrases propositions of the form “S thinks of X” as “S thinks X-ly” 
or “S thinks X-wise.” According to Kriegel (2008, p. 91), adverbialist paraphrases are 
conservative paraphrases: they reveal the “deep grammar” of our everyday intentional 
talk. Arguably, however, adverbialist paraphrases can be taken to be revisionary para-
phrases, in that they clearly display a radical departure from our everyday intentional 
talk (see, notably, Woodling 2016, pp. 493–494 and Banick 2018).20 Consider the fol-
lowing sentence: 
 
Chancellor Merkel is thinking about the budget deficit of the fiscal year. 
 
The adverbialist paraphrase runs as follows: 
 
Chancellor Merkel is thinking budget-deficit-of-the-fiscal-yearly. 
 
It is hard to maintain that we find such sentences in our everyday intentional talk. More-
over, it is widely accepted that if we can avoid revising ordinary ways of speaking, we 
should. Revision has a cost (see, e.g., Kriegel 2008, p. 91). So we are in a position to see 
why we should opt for the radical relationist solution: unlike the adverbial property 
solution, the radical relationist solution does not inflict a kind of violence over our 
everyday intentional talk. 
 
20 Kriegel (2008, pp. 91–92) himself takes into account the reading of the adverbial property solution as 
a revisionary account of intentionality. In this connection, Woodling (2016, pp. 495–505) argues that the 
adverbial property solution is not only revisionary but also parasitic, in that it depends for its intelligi-
bility on ordinary way of speaking. For an adverbialist reply, see Banick (2018). 
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The defender of the adverbial property solution could make the following rejoinder: 
true, the radical relationist solution is not revisionary as an account of intentionality; 
however, this is only because the radical relationist is revisionist in another respect, 
namely, with respect to a “principle” governing relations. One might say that unlike 
the radical relationist solution, the adverbial property solution respects the intuition 
that relations entail the existence of their relata. In response one could argue that this 
intuition is only an alleged intuition. This becomes clear when one considers that it is a 
thesis which is rejected by several scholars. As we have seen, some have argued that 
the alleged intuition is rather the conclusion of fallacious reasoning (notably Priest 
2005), while others have straightforwardly held that its negation is true (notably Twar-
dowski 1894, late Brentano, and Grossmann 1994). More generally, the radical rela-
tionist could note the asymmetry between the two moves at issue: while our everyday 
intentional talk does not display adverbialist structures at all, more than one scholar 
maintains that relations do not entail the existence of their relata. 
 
4   Potential issues for radical relationism 
 
I have argued that a radical relationist solution to the problem of intentional inexist-
ence is to be preferred over the two most prominent ones. However, the fact that rad-
ical relationism is comparatively preferable does not entail that it is immune to diffi-
culties. In this section, I address some potential issues that radical relationists must 
face. 
 
4.1   Ontological commitment 
 
A first issue is raised by Crane. According to him, to reject (2) and maintain (3) 
amounts to committing oneself to an “ontology of non-existent objects” (Crane 2001a, 
p. 24)―something which he takes to be “hard to understand” (Crane 2001a, p. 25), if 
not “fraught with problems” (2001b, p. 339). In other words, to reject (2) and maintain 
(3) implies that we “are prepared to quantify over things which do not exist” (Crane 
2001a, p. 24)―a violation of the “Quineian orthodoxy.” Hence, for Crane (2001a, p. 24) 
the radical relationist would be forced to state “there are things which do not exist” 
and “there are objects which do not exist.” 
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But it is not clear how rejecting (2) would lead to such an ontological commitment. 
At any rate, we can ask: is the radical relationist really committed to this way of speak-
ing and hence to the “ontology” at issue? Arguably, the answer is no. For the radical 
relationist may treat “There are […]” and “[…] exist” as stylistic variants: for instance, 
she may say that “Unicorns do not exist” is equivalent to “There are no unicorns.” 
Consequently, she may refuse to say “There are things which do not exist” or “There 
are objects which do not exist.” All the radical relationist has to grant is that some things 
do not exist or that some objects do not exist.21 In other words, all the radical relationist 
has to deny is that “some” expresses existence―or better yet, that “some” is equivalent 
to “there are.” 
Admittedly, such a denial still amounts to a violation of the Quinean orthodoxy, for 
on the latter, quantification implies existential introduction, in that “Some x’s are F” is 
treated as equivalent to “There are x’s which are F.” However, there are reasons to hold 
that ordinary language quantifiers like “some” and “most” do not express existence 
(see Mankowitz forthcoming). Crane (2011, pp. 54–61) himself has argued for the view 
that the semantics of “some” should not be understood as implying existence. In this 
regard, consider ordinary language sentences like “Some characters in War and Peace 
existed and some did not” (the example is from Crane 2011, p. 47). Such sentences are 
not only grammatical but also true. But if this is so, the radical relationist is not re-




21 The radical relationist could point out that “Some objects do not exist” is a consequence of the con-
junction of the following three propositions: some things do not exist; sometimes we think of things 
which do not exist; X is an object if and only if one thinks of X (where “one” stands for an individual, a 
collective, or whatever kind of subject one can conceive of). In this connection, the notion of object which 
is at work here is worth recalling. First, to be an object does not entail being a thing of a certain 
kind―things of whatever kind can be objects; second, being an object does not entail existing, for non-
existents can also be objects. If I think of the number 9, then the number 9 is an object; if I think of a 
certain thought, then that thought is an object; and if I think of Pegasus, then Pegasus is an object. We 
can say that this notion of object is not only “schematic”―to borrow a term from Crane (2001a, b)―but 
also existentially neutral. In this regard, consider the notoriously imprecise expression “There is no ob-
ject,” which is often used with regard to thoughts about non-existents. Such an expression can be dis-
ambiguated in two ways: it can be read either as saying that nothing is thought about or as saying that 
what is thought about does not exist. The latter reading is plausible, but the former is not, for we think 
about something even when thinking about non-existents. 
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4.2   Substitutivity failure, scrutability, non-specificity 
 
Kriegel (2008, pp. 87–88) argues that there are three phenomena which “may also offer 
support for an adverbialist view.” In his own words, these are “failure of substitution 
of co-referential terms,” “scrutability,” and “non-specificity.” In Kriegel’s terms, these 
are defined as follows:  
 
SUBSTITUTIVITY FAILURE. That one thinks of X does not entail that one thinks of Y, 
even if X = Y.22 
SCRUTABILITY. That one thinks of X does not entail that one thinks of all of the 
undetached parts of X. 
NON-SPECIFICITY. That one thinks of an X does not entail that one thinks either of 
an F or of a G, even if an X is either F or G. 
 
Kriegel seems to be arguing that while the adverbial property solution respects the 
aforementioned phenomena, a radical relationist solution is at odds with them. As for 
substitutivity failure, he (2008, p. 87) writes: 
 
We all know that from the facts that x represents y and y = z it does not follow that 
x represents z. But here too, from the facts that x bears relation R to y and that y = 
z, it does follow that x bears R to z. This applies to the representation relation: from 
the facts that x bears the representation relation to y and that y = z it follows that x 
bears the representation relation to z. However, from the facts that x represents y-
wise and y = z it does not follow that x represents z-wise. Thus it is possible to 
think Phosphorus-wise without thinking Hesperus-wise (namely, if one’s 
thought’s inferential role or phenomenal character is Phosphorescent rather than 
Hesperescent), even though it is impossible to bear a relation to Phosphorus with-
out bearing it to Hesperus. 
 
Concerning scrutability and non-specificity, he (2008, p. 87) states: 
 
Likewise, there should be facts of the matter (to do with inferential role or phe-
nomenal character) that distinguish thinking rabbit-wise from thinking unde-
tached-rabbit-parts-wise, even if it is impossible to bear a relation to rabbits with-
out bearing it to undetached rabbit parts, the two being necessarily coextensive. 
The representation relation may well be inscrutable in the relevant sense, but the 
 
22 Here and henceforth “X = Y” is to be read as “‘X’ and ‘Y’ refer to one and the same thing.” 
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representation modification (i.e., representation as understood by the adverbialist) 
is very likely scrutable. Further: it is possible to imagine a Greek without imagin-
ing either a blue-eyed Greek or a brown-eyed Greek, even though it is impossible to 
bear a relation to a Greek without bearing it either to a blue-eyed Greek or to a 
brown-eyed Greek. What is possible is to imagine Greek-wise without imagining 
either blue-eyed-Greek-wise or brown-eyed-Greek-wise.23 
 
Kriegel seems to argue that a radical relationist solution leads to the following theses: 
 
• That one thinks of X entails that one thinks of Y, when X = Y. 
• That one thinks of X entails that one thinks of all of the undetached parts of X. 
• That one thinks of an X entails that one thinks either of an F or of a G, when an X is 
either F or G.  
 
Clearly, these three theses contradict SUBSTITUTIVITY FAILURE, SCRUTABILITY, and NON-
SPECIFICITY respectively. How is it that the radical relationist solution leads to these 
theses? Kriegel aptly recalls three principles: 
 
(R1) If x bears a relation to y and y = z, then x bears a relation to z. 
(R2) If x bears a relation to y and y is coextensive with z, then x bears a relation to z. 
(R3) If x bears a relation to an y and an y is either F or G, then x bears a relation either to 
an F or to a G. 
 
Clearly, if I am related to Hesperus and Hesperus = Phosphorus (i.e., “Hesperus” and 
“Phosphorus” refer to one and the same thing), then I am related to Phosphorus. Clear-
ly, if I am related to a horse, then I am related to all its undetached parts, for the two 
are coextensive (the horse is nothing but all its undetached parts). And clearly, if I am 
related to a German and a German is either brown-eyed or blue-eyed (let us say), then 
I am related either to a brown-eyed German or a blue-eyed German. 
Now recall how a radical relationist conceives of intentionality. In her eyes, “x 
thinks of y” expresses a relation as much as “x steps on y” or “x is brighter than y” do. 
Concerning these relations, it is natural to hold the following. First, if one hits Hes-
perus, then one hits Phosphorus (viz., in hitting Hesperus I hit Phosphorus, and vice 
 
23 Similar considerations are made by Byrne (2006, p. 407), who argues that the phenomena of substitu-
tivity failure and non-specificity speak against the view of intentionality as a relation between a thinker 
and what that thinker is thinking about. On these grounds, he puts forward something analogous to the 
intentional content solution.  
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versa). Further, if one hits a horse, then one hits all of its undetached parts. Finally, if 
one hits a German, then one hits either a blue-eyed German or a brown-eyed German. 
Analogously, if Hesperus is brighter than the sun (let us say), then Phosphorus is 
brighter than the sun. Hence, on the radical relationist solution, we must say that one 
cannot think of Hesperus without thinking of Phosphorus, that one cannot think of a 
horse without thinking of all its undetached parts, and that one cannot think of a Ger-
man without thinking of either a blue-eyed German or a brown-eyed German. By con-
trast, Kriegel argues, the adverbial property solution respects the phenomena in ques-
tion: one can think Hesperus-wise without thinking Phosphorus-wise, and one can 
think horse-wise without thinking undetached-horse-parts-wise. Generally speaking, 
that one thinks X-wise does not imply that one thinks Y-wise, even in those cases in 
which X = Y or X is coextensive with Y. Furthermore, one can think German-wise with-
out thinking either blue-eyed-German-wise or brown-eyed-German-wise. Generally 
speaking, one can think X-wise without thinking F-X-wise or G-X-wise, even in those 
cases in which an X is either F or G. 
How should a radical relationist respond? An easy way is to deny the validity of 
the principles that Kriegel brings into play, namely, R1, R2, and R3. In my view, this 
path is not worth pursuing; I argue instead that the radical relationist should draw 
attention to a certain distinction. Once this distinction is employed, the radical rela-
tionist is in a position to give a rendition of the three phenomena which differs from 
the one given by Kriegel. On this alternative rendition, which is plausible, the radical 
relationist solution turns out to be compatible with the phenomena in question. 
This distinction is between thinking <X> and thinking of or about X.24 The former con-
cerns the question “What is your thought?” (or impressionistically: “What is passing 
through your mind?”), whereas the latter concerns the question “What is your thought 
about?” (or impressionistically: “What is your mind directed towards?”). We could 
say that “thinking <X>” simply describes the fact of entertaining a certain thought 
(where what is put within angle brackets specifies which thought it is), while “thinking 
about X” describes the fact of entertaining a thought about X―a thought which is nec-
essarily a relation to X. Here <Hesperus> is to be conceived of as that which expresses 
a certain (intentional) relation, so that the fact that one is thinking <Hesperus> means 
that the (intentional) relation <Hesperus> obtains between oneself and Hesperus, in 
this order (i.e., one is thinking about Hesperus, but Hesperus is not thinking about 
 
24 From now on I use angle brackets instead of quotation marks to distinguish thoughts from their verbal 
counterparts (i.e., expressions) more accurately. 
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oneself). Following Crane (2013, p. 9), who defines aboutness as “the representation of 
something in words or thoughts,” we can also say that “one thinks <X>” is equivalent 
to “the word X passes through one’s mind.” It is worth noting that properly speaking 
that which is put within angle brackets is not something “in addition” to the thinking, 
for it simply tells us which thinking is in question. In short, what is put within angle 
brackets is simply the thinking-about relation in question, so that instead of saying that 
one thinks <Hesperus>, one can say simply that (the relation) <Hesperus> obtains be-
tween oneself and Hesperus (informally, that <Hesperus> passes through one’s 
mind).25,26 
Equipped with the distinction between thinking <X> and thinking about X, consider 
substitutivity failure. The radical relationist can say the following. First, if one thinks 
<Hesperus>, then one is related to Hesperus, and hence to Venus; and if one thinks 
<Phosphorus>, then one is related to Phosphorus, and hence to Venus―although 
through something different. For the fact that a certain relation obtains between x and 
y does not entail that that relation is the only relation which obtains between x and y. 
It can be that a different relation also obtains between x and y. For instance, arguably 
both the relation is-brighter-than and the relation is-smaller-than obtain between He-
sperus and the sun. <Hesperus> is an intentional relation R between a thinker and 
Venus, whereas <Phosphorus> is an intentional relation R* between a thinker (possi-
bly the same one) and Venus. Otherwise stated: in thinking <Hesperus> one is related 
to Venus via R; in thinking <Phosphorus> one is related to Venus via R*. R and R* are 
relations which share a single relatum. In this regard, consider a situation in which both 
 
25 I will go on using “One thinks <X>” for presentational reasons, especially in order to mark the distinc-
tion with thinking about X. Notice that when we think of Hesperus, we are thinking about a plan-
et―hence, we are entertaining a first-order thought; by contrast, when we think of <Hesperus>, we are 
thinking about a thought―hence, we are entertaining a second-order thought. Taking inspiration from 
Brentano’s (1874) terminology, one can say that in the first case a primary intentional relation obtains, 
whereas in the second case a secondary intentional relation obtains. 
26 An anonymous reviewer for this journal suggests that the distinction between thinking <X> and 
thinking about X can be employed to defend a solution on which all thoughts are relations between 
thinkers and the things they are about and relations entail the existence of their relata. The defender of 
this solution, he goes on, can contend that although one can think <Pegasus>, one cannot think about 
Pegasus (because Pegasus does not exist). There is nothing incoherent in such an implementation of the 
distinction at issue. However, this results into the denial of (1), which is the most plausible claim of the 
triad (see §3 above).    
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Eva (“E,” say) and John (“J,” say) think <Hesperus> and a situation in which (only) 
Eva thinks both <Hesperus> and <Phosphorus>. We can write them as follows: 
 
R(E,V) ∧ R(J,V) 
R(E,V) ∧ R*(E,V) 
 
Where “V” stands for Venus. That one thinks about Venus implies that a(n intentional) 
relation between oneself and Venus obtains, in this order. But the fact that R obtains 
does not entail that R* obtains, nor does the fact that R* obtains entail that R obtains. 
Compare: the fact that Ali gives a punch to Clay implies that a punching (hence causal) 
relation obtains between Ali and Clay. But the fact that Ali punches Clay via punch A 
does not entail that Ali punches Clay via punch B (where A ≠ B). Maybe he stops a 
moment before. Consider also the following parallel: the fact that Ali is standing close 
to Clay entails that a spatial relation obtains between Ali and Clay, but the fact that Ali 
is standing two feet from Clay does not entail that Ali is standing three feet from Clay. 
Furthermore, if one thinks of Hesperus, then one is related to Phosphorus; and if one 
thinks of Phosphorus, then one is related to Hesperus. Finally, if one thinks of Hes-
perus, then one thinks of Phosphorus; and if one thinks of Phosphorus, then one thinks 
of Hesperus. By contrast, one can think <Hesperus> without thinking <Phosphorus> 
and one can think <Phosphorus> without thinking <Hesperus>, for one might not 
know that Hesperus = Phosphorus. Generally speaking, the radical relationist can af-
firm: 
 
SUBSTITUTIVITY FAILURE*. The fact that one thinks <X> does not entail that one 
thinks <Y>, even if X = Y. 
 
On this view, if one thinks <Hesperus>, then one thinks of Venus; by contrast, the fact 
that one thinks of Venus (i.e., of Hesperus) does not entail that one thinks <Hesperus>, 
for one can think of Venus (i.e., of Hesperus) by thinking <Phosphorus>. In Kriegel’s 
(2007, p. 308, 2008, p. 87) terminology, we can say that while one represents Hesperus 
if and only if one represents Phosphorus, the fact that one represents x via the repre-
sentation <Hesperus> does not entail that one represents x via the representation 
<Phosphorus>. 
In more technical terms, the radical relationist can maintain that what is to be re-
garded as an intensional context is not “One thinks of X,” but rather “One thinks <X>.” 
In our example: the context in which we find terms that are not substitutable salva 
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veritate is not “One thinks of Hesperus,” but rather “One thinks <Hesperus>” (i.e., 
“One entertains <Hesperus>”). This rendition of the failure of substitutivity of co-ref-
erential terms, I submit, can hardly be regarded as strange, for the phenomenon in 
question has been discovered by considering the condition of holding a certain thought 
to be true (see Frege 1892, p. 32), not the condition of thinking about something.27 
Now consider scrutability and non-specificity. We may say: first, if one thinks of a 
horse, then one thinks of all its undetached parts; by contrast, one can think <horse> 
without thinking <all of the undetached parts of the horse>.28 Second, if one thinks of 
a German, then one thinks either of a blue-eyed German or of a brown-eyed German; 
by contrast, one can think <a German> without thinking either <a blue-eyed German> 
or <a brown-eyed German>. More generally, the radical relationist can affirm the fol-
lowing: 
 
SCRUTABILITY*. The fact that one thinks <X> does not entail that one thinks <all 
of the undetached parts of X.> 
NON-SPECIFICITY*. The fact that one thinks <an X> does not entail either that one 
thinks <an FX> or that one thinks <a GX>, even if X is either F or G. 
 
Informally, we can say that radical relationism respects two facts: first, that non-mer-
eological thoughts are different from (and can occur without) mereological thoughts; 
and second, that non-specific thoughts are different from (and can occur without) spe-
cific thoughts. 
 
27 In Priest’s (2005, pp. 61–63) terms, we can say that the failure is not within the scope of intentional 
predicates, but rather within the scope of intentional operators. On this distinction, which Priest relies on 
in defending a radical relationist view of intentionality, see especially Priest (2005, Ch. 1.2). 
28 The same holds with respect to every single part of a given thing, for if x bears a relation to y and z is 
a part of y, then x bears a relation to z, since by definition a whole entails its parts. If one hits a horse (in 
its totality), then one hits its front left hoof. Accordingly, if one thinks of a horse, then one thinks of its 
front left hoof. However, the fact that one thinks <X> does not entail that one thinks <Y>, even if Y is 
part of X. For instance, the fact that one thinks <horse> does not entail that one thinks <front left hoof 
of the horse>. Analogous considerations apply to the case of self-locating beliefs, which Kriegel (2008, p. 
87) claims are something which speaks in favour of adverbialism. Consider John, who unbeknownst to 
him is making a mess in a store by pushing around a cart with a torn bag of sugar. On the radical rela-
tionist view, if John thinks of the person who is making a mess, then John thinks of himself. However, 
the fact that John entertains <The person with the torn bag is making a mess> does not entail that John 
entertains <I myself am making a mess>. 
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I conclude that phenomena such as substitutivity failure, scrutability, and non-spec-
ificity do not constitute reasons to reject a radical relationist solution to the prob-lem 
of intentional inexistence. 
 
5   Résumé 
 
Let me take stock. Negatively, I have argued that the extant arguments for the view 
that relations entail the existence of their relata are wanting (§3.1). In this regard, I have 
defended a sort of pluralism about relations, according to which there is more than 
one kind of relation that involves non-existents. Specifically, I have defended this plu-
ralism against Kriegel’s attack, which I have argued rests on a disputable postulation 
of ambiguity, which might be accused of either violating Grice’s razor or secretly em-
ploying a kind of exceptionalism, or also of resting on a false asymmetry claim. 
Positively, I have argued that there are reasons to maintain that all thoughts are re-
lations between thinkers and the things they are about (§3.2), or in my own terms, that 
there are reasons to be a radical relationist (about intentionality). More precisely, I have 
argued that the radical relationist solution is to be preferred to both the adverbial prop-
erty solution and the intentional content solution. Unlike the former, the radical rela-
tionist solution is not revisionary, for it respects our ordinary way of speaking; and 
compared to the latter, the radical relationist solution is more parsimonious, for it de-
scribes the structure of veridical intentionality by invoking only one kind of relation. 
As for radical relationism, I have argued for two theses (§4). The first is that radical 
relationism does not force us to embrace an “ontology of non-existent objects.” In this 
regard, the radical relationist can appeal to the view that ordinary-language quantifi-
ers do not express existence―a view which is plausible on independent grounds (§4.1). 
The second thesis is that radical relationism respects phenomena such as the failure of 
substitutivity of co-referential terms, scrutability, and non-specificity (§4.2). This can 
be seen once the distinction between thinking <X> and thinking about X is taken into 
account. If I am correct, then the view of intentionality (i.e., aboutness) as a relation 
between a subject (a thinker) and an object (what the subject thinks of) has advantages 









I here provide a complete list of the radical relationist theses stated in §4.2 with the aid 
of a simple formalism. The basic tenets of the radical relationist can be put as follows:  
 
S thinks of X ⊨ R(S,X) 
S thinks <X> ⊨ R(S,X) 
S thinks <X> ⊨ S thinks of X 
¬(S thinks of X ⊨ S thinks <X>) 
 
Where the first line is to be read as, for instance, “If Eva thinks of Hesperus, then an 
intentional relation obtains between Eva and Hesperus, in this order,” the second line 
as, for instance, “If Eva thinks <Hesperus>, then (the intentional relation) <Hesperus> 
obtains between Eva and Hesperus, in this order,” and the third line as, for instance, 
“if Eva thinks <Hesperus>, then Eva thinks of Hesperus.”  
Next, concerning substitutivity failure, we can write (let an asterisk indicate differ-
ence between relations): 
 
(S thinks <X> ∧ (X = Y)) ⊨ R(S,X) 
(S thinks <Y> ∧ (X = Y)) ⊨ R*(S,Y) 
(S thinks <X> ∧ (X = Y)) ⊨ R(S,Y) 
(S thinks <Y> ∧ (X = Y)) ⊨ R*(S,X) 
(S thinks of X ∧ (X = Y)) ⊨ S thinks of Y 
(S thinks of Y ∧ (X = Y)) ⊨ S thinks of X 
¬((S thinks <X> ∧ (X = Y)) ⊨ S thinks <Y>) 
¬((S thinks <Y> ∧ (X = Y)) ⊨ S thinks <X>) 
¬((S thinks of X ∧ (X = Y)) ⊨ S thinks <Y>) 
¬((S thinks of Y ∧ (X = Y)) ⊨ S thinks <X>) 
 
Concerning scrutability, we can write (let “α ≡ β” stand for “α is coextensive with β”): 
 
(S thinks <X> ∧ ((X ≡ Y)) ⊨ R(S,X) 
(S thinks <Y> ∧ (X ≡ Y)) ⊨ R*(S,Y) 
(S thinks <X> ∧ (X ≡ Y)) ⊨ R(S,Y) 
(S thinks <Y> ∧ (X ≡ Y)) ⊨ R*(S,X) 
(S thinks of X ∧ (X ≡ Y)) ⊨ S thinks of Y 
(S thinks of Y ∧ (X ≡ Y)) ⊨ S thinks of X 
¬((S thinks <X> ∧ (X ≡ Y)) ⊨ S thinks <Y>) 
¬((S thinks <Y> ∧ (X ≡ Y)) ⊨ S thinks <X>) 
¬((S thinks of X ∧ (X ≡ Y)) ⊨ S thinks <Y>) 
¬((S thinks of Y ∧ (X ≡ Y)) ⊨ S thinks <X>) 
 
In the case of co-referential terms (i.e., substitutivity failure) and coextensivity (i.e., 
scrutability), the bridging theses are the following: 
 
(R(α,β) ∧ (β = γ)) ⊨ R(α,γ) 
(R(α,β) ∧ (β ≡ γ)) ⊨ R(α,γ) 
¬(R(α,β) ⊨ R*(α,β)) 
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¬(R*(α,β) ⊨ R(α,β)) 
 
The first thesis is the formal rendition of R1, whereas the second thesis is the formal 
rendition of R2. For example: if (the relation) <Hesperus>―R, say―obtains between 
Eva and Hesperus and Hesperus = Phosphorus, then R obtains between Eva and Phos-
phorus. However, that R obtains between Eva and Hesperus (i.e., Phosphorus) does 
not entail that (the relation) <Phosphorus>―R*, say―obtains between Eva and Hes-
perus (i.e., Phosphorus). Furthermore, the fact that R* obtains does not entail that R 
obtains. Analogous considerations apply to coextensivity and hence to scrutability. 
Finally, concerning non-specificity (let the letter P stand for properties): 
 
• (S thinks <an X> ∧ (P1X ∨ P2X ∨ … ∨ PnX)) ⊨ (R(S,P1X) ∨ R(S,P2X) ∨ … ∨ R(S,PnX)) 
• S thinks <a PiX> ⊨ R*(S,PiX)  
• (S thinks of an X ∧ (P1X ∨ P2X ∨ … ∨ PnX)) ⊨ (S thinks of a P1X ∨ S thinks of a P2X ∨ … 
∨ S thinks of a PnX) 
• ¬((S thinks <an X> ∧ (P1X ∨ P2X ∨ … ∨ PnX)) ⊨ (S thinks <a P1X> ∨ S thinks <a P2X> ∨ 
… ∨ S thinks <a PnX>)) 
• ¬((S thinks of an X ∧ (P1X ∨ P2X ∨ … ∨ PnX)) ⊨ (S thinks <a P1X> ∨ S thinks <a P2X> ∨ 
… ∨ S thinks <a PnX>)) 
 
where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and the bridging thesis is R3. For example: if (the relation) <a Ger-
man>―R, say―obtains between Eva and a German and a German is either blue-eyed 
or brown-eyed (say), then either R obtains between Eva and a blue-eyed German or R 
obtains between Eva and a brown-eyed German. However, the fact that R obtains be-
tween Eva and a blue-eyed German does not entail that (the relation) <a blue-eyed 
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